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13 August 1982

DIA review completed.

State Dept. review completed

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| | | _ |
| | | |
| | Contents | |
| | | |
| | Israel-Lebanon: New Cease-Fire | |
| | | 25X |
| | Egypt-US: Strains in Relations 4 | |
| | | |
| | Libya-Chad: Growing Interference 6 | 25X |
| | China-USSR: Senior Official Visits Moscow | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | Spain: Election Preparations 9 | -25X6 |
| | | -23 / 6 |
| | | |
| | The state of the s | |
| | Cuba-Grenada: Airport Construction Project | |
| | Special Analysis | |
| | Poland: Prospects for Renewed Unrest | |
| | | |
| | | |
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| | ISRAEL-LEBANON: New Cease-Fire | | |
| | (Information as of 2330 EDT | ") | 25X1 |
| | //Israel agreed yesterday to a cease-fire hours of intensive air and artillery attacks. Language have suspended talks with Ambassador Habib.// | following several sebanese negotiators | 20,711 |
| | //Israeli fighter aircraft bombed a and southwest Beirut nearly continuously 10 hours before the start of the cease-f naval guns, tanks, and artillery blanket of the city with fire. According to an spokesman, units near the Hippodrome exp of control to eliminate harassing fire. | for more than ire, while Israeli ed large areas Israeli military anded their area | _ 25X1 |
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| | Defense Minister Sharon has said that th | a rainfargaments | |
| | around Juniyah are to prevent anyone from Lebanon without Israeli consent. Estably presence farther north on the coast and area would improve Israel's ability to pure Syria to remove its forces from Lebanon the remaining Palestinian enclaves in the | m moving into ishing a military in the Al Matn ut pressure on and to evict | |
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| Habib Mission Lebanese negotiators suspended talks in the wake of the Israeli attacks yesterday. Comment: //The continuing Israeli attacks are eroding Habib's credibility with the Lebanese Muslims. | 25X1 25X1 |
| According to press accounts, the cabinet decision to announce a cease-fire came after a meeting at which several ministers repeated charges that Defense Minister Sharon had acted without proper authority in ordering the air attacks. | 25X1 |
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| EGYPT-US: Strains in Relations | |
| //Egypt's ties with the US have been subjected to new strains because of events in Lebanon, but Egyptian officials remain anxious to avoid a serious breach with Washington.// | 25X1 |
| The US Embassy reports Egyptian confidence in US intentions and good faith has eroded considerably over the past two months. Even ordinarily pro-American Egyptians are expressing disappointment and anger over the US response to Israel's actions in Lebanon. | 25X1 |
| //President Mubarak, partly because of such sentiments in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, has felt compelled to put some distance between himself and the US. Among other moves, he has allowed extensive criticism of the US in the media and refused US requests that Egypt accept a contingent of Palestinians from Lebanon.// | 25X1 |
| Comment: //Depending on the course of events in Lebanon, this climate is likely to reduce the closeness of bilateral relations in the months ahead. Mubarak, for example, probably will be less willing to cooperate openly on strategic regional issues.// | 25X1 |
| //Mubarak also will push for US efforts to arrange an early Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He probably will continue to insist that Washington make some significant gesture to revitalize the peace process, and Egypt may consult more actively with other states about new approaches to the Palestinian autonomy negotiations.// | 25X1 |
| //Nonetheless, Mubarak clearly hopes to maintain the basic elements of the US-Egyptian relationship. Continued US economic aid is particularly vital for Mubarak at a time when he is coming under increasing domestic criticism for his lack of firm action toward economic problems.// | 25X1 |
| //The President still believes the US can play an important regional security role. He probably remains convinced only the US can put effective pressure on Israel on Palestinian issues.// | 25X1 |
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| LIBYA-CHAD: Growing Interference | 25X1 |
| Libyan-backed factions are intensifying efforts to prevent President Habre from achieving a national reconciliation. | 25X1 |
| Habre's forces have repelled small attacks in east-central Chad by members of a pro-Libyan faction that had been allied with former President Goukouni. No fighting had been reported in this area since Habre's takeover last June. | 25X1 |
| | |
| According to press reports, southern anti-Kamougue forces claim to have occupied the city of Bongor in a continuation of factional fighting that resumed earlier this month. Kamougue, Achiek, and Habre are said to be in Gabon for exploratory talks arranged by France and Gabon. | 25X1 25X1 |
| Comment: Libya will continue to stir factional unrest wherever possible in Chad. While Libyan-aided factions cannot defeat Habre militarily, they can keep the regime off balance and at least hinder Habre's efforts to achieve a peaceful reconciliation. | S |
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| CHINA-USSR: Middle Level Official Visits | Moscow | |
| The reported visit to Moscow by a Chinese official suggests Beijing intends to keep hinting its approach to the Soviets in order to influence the US. | a at flexibility in | 25X1 |
| Indian diplomats in Beijing state Ye Director of Soviet Affairs, is in Moscow expected to hold discussions with his Soviet is said to be visiting at the invitate Ambassador. East German diplomats in Bestold the Indians that Mikhail Kapitsa, the official responsible for Chinese affairs a visit during his stay in Beijing earlies | , where he is viet counterparts. ion of the Chinese ijing also have he senior Soviet , suggested such | 25X1 |
| Comment: Yu would be the first Chir to visit Moscow since 1979. China has perviewed its relations with the USSR while the US on Taiwan, and Yu may have traveled inform Chinese officials there about decining the party meetings in Beijing last | eriodically re- negotiating with ed to Moscow to isions reached at | |
| If Yu has substantive discussions with trip would add a political dimension continuing effort to reduce bilateral tering trade, educational, and other contact | to Beijing's | 25X1 |
| The Soviets almost certainly would it visit as a new sign of Beijing's interest dialogue. They probably would offer to econtacts and might hint at concessions or dispute. The Soviet attache in Beijing, recently told the US defense attache that accept the main channel as the border on Amur Rivers—apparently without restating ervation that the USSR has to retain possible in the possible in the state of the | t in a political expand bilateral the border for example, to Moscow would the Ussuri and grits usual res- | 25X1 |
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| SPAIN: Election Preparations | |
| The Socialists now are in the lead as politic prepare for a national election. | al parties 25X1 |
| The election was to occur by next spriculd be held as early as this fall. Pressindicate the Socialists will present parlia controversial legislative proposals this fato divide and topple the Center Democratic and precipitate an early election. A Social has already announced his party will campai employment, economic recovery, expanded cit and administrative reform. | reports ment with all in order government alist spokesman qn for fuller |
| Leaders of the rapidly ascending Popul have said they will campaign on the differentheir program of incentives for the private the Socialists' reliance on the public sect Central Democratic leadership is trying to early election to gain time to present a unto the electorate after several months of intraparty conflict. Both right-of-center pondering an electoral alliance with each cas with the three new center and conservation launched in recent weeks. | ence between e sector and cor. The new estave off an eited front entense parties are other as well |
| Comment: //The Socialists want to for this fall before their momentum dissipates. and conservative parties and the Communists reasons for delaying elections, however, an overcome their serious policy differences i keep parliament in session through the fall | The centrist all have d will strive to n order to |
| With a big lead in the polls and a ner the military, the Socialists are taking the with their moderate platform. The right-of parties, which are resigned to a possible l and aware strident rhetoric could be counte also are planning to avoid highly emotional tional campaigns. That stance could change elections are delayed until the next year a ists begin to lose their lead. | high road -center eftist victory rproductive, or confronta- , however, if nd the Social- |
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| CUBA-GRENADA: | Airport Con | struction Pr | roject | |
| //Cuba is | acceleratin a, according | g constructi to a US off | on of the new air- | |
| the island in | mid-July. | | | |
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| SPECIAL ANALYSIS | |
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| POLAND: Prospects for Renewed Unrest | 25X1 |
| The next two weeks will be a volatile period in Poland. Dis- | |
| content has increased, Solidarity has called for renewed opposition, and important religious celebrations will attract large crowds. Although demonstrations are not likely to be widespread, sporadic unrest could lead to serious clashes with the police. Some protests could occur as early as today, which marks eight months of martial law, | 25X1 |
| The regime will use whatever force is necessary to keep the situation under control. | 25X1 |
| Militancy seems to be on the rise. Frustrations have been building over steadily declining living standards and tight martial law restrictions. The regime's failure to relax martial law restrictions significantly or to allow the papal visit in August has heightened | 25X1 |
| discontent. | 25X1 |
| Solidarity activists and apparently some rank-and-file adherents are angry over the regime's refusal to allow Solidarity any role. Union sources claim sentiment for protest actions is strong throughout the country. | |
| Solidarity and the Church | 20/(1 |
| The underground leadership of Solidarity has called for two weeks of peaceful protests culminating in a large demonstration on 31 August to commemorate the second anniversary of the union's founding. | 25X1 |
| the leaders want to prove the union is still a political force to be reckoned with while | 25X1 |
| restraining the militancy they see in the factories. They reluctantly called for the demonstrations to maintain their credibility with workers. | 25X1 |
| Solidarity's move to renew protest activity reverses its decision in July to suspend agitation in the hope that the regime would relax martial law and allow the | |
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| Pope to visit this month. Union leaders also realized | 25X1 |
| many workers had been intimidated by the regime's harsh measures following earlier protests. | |
| | |
| Leaders of the Catholic Church are concerned about 25 the possibility of violence but have not hesitated to blame the regime publicly for the delay of the papal visit. They are going ahead with the traditional pilgrimage to the southern city of Czestochowa and with the celebration of the 600th anniversary of Poland's most sacred icon. Both events will draw large crowds—including large numbers of young people—full of nationalist fervor. | 5X1 25X1 |
| The Church seems likely to keep criticism of the government within bounds and control the large crowds. On the other hand, there almost certainly will be some outbursts against martial law. 25X1 | |
| Premier Jaruzelski seems satisfied with the superficial calm he has imposed through intimidation but remains concerned over Solidarity's potential power. In making only token concessions last month, however, he may have misjudged the popular mood and failed to grasp the extent to which expectations were raised by the Church and by moderates in the regime as they urged more conciliatory policies. | X1 |
| The government continues to portray the union's leaders as a small group of militants with little support and has contemptuously dismissed the union's calls on the population to oppose the regime. The recent crackdown on Solidarity activists involved in printing leaflets and newspapers, however, indicates a new sense of apprehension in the government. More such actions are likely to thwart union militants and to intimidate would-be demonstrators. | 5X1 |
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Jaruzelski will not hesitate to use force to counter protests. The authorities recently have been circumspect when faced with demonstrations and probably will not interfere directly with the religious observances.

The government will respond if provoked or if demonstrations appear to be escalating. The riot police could overreact and turn peaceful demonstrations into violent clashes—as they have in the past.

Outlook

Widespread unrest seems unlikely, but there could be enough incidents to prompt strong repressive measures.

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Jaruzelski remains committed to a lengthy period of stringent military rule. A new round of disorders would make the regime more uneasy and would prompt it to place an even higher priority on coercion, further widening the gap between the government and the people. Jaruzelski believes, nevertheless, that time is on his side and that he can eventually wear down resistance.

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